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BOOK REVIEWS
ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS.

By

John A. Robertson. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1974. Pp. xxix
+ 533. Softbound. $6.95.
Reviewed by Keith C. Monroe*
For every Ernesto Miranda whose name becomes a
nationally-known legal symbol,' countless hundreds of thousands of accused persons come in contact with the court system
every year in quiet anonymity through the medium of the lower
criminal courts. These courts, designated in various jurisdictions as municipal courts, police courts, recorder's courts or
some other distinctive title, mark the place of the initial, and
for most defendants the only, contact with the judicial system.
Where the accusation is no more serious than a traffic infraction, the defendants' impression of justice in the American
judicial system will be largely dependant on the fairness and
dignity with which they are treated in that one exposure to the
courtroom. Similarly, the first contact of many other minor
offenders-the petty thief, the drunk, the non-supporting father-will also be with an inferior criminal court. Surely, then,
those courts are the places where respect or disrespect for the
court system has its genesis. As Professor Robertson aptly observes, while these "inferior" courts are inferior in name and
in the judicial pecking order, they are far from inferior in the
function they perform. 2
Although Robertson does not go so far as to say that the
current "crime explosion" may have its roots in the existing
inadequacies and shortcomings of the lower criminal courts,
that proposition is implicit in a large proportion of the materials he has selected for this collection of essays. The book is
obviously intended to be an overview of lower criminal courts,
with sections devoted to their origin, social organization, politics, performance, and alternative models; finally, several con* A.B., 1960, J.D., 1962, Stanford University; member of the California Bar and
the United States Supreme Court Bar.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See J. ROBERTSON, ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES
xvii-xxx (1974) [hereinafter cited as ROSERTSON].
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crete and experimental proposals for the reformation of these
courts are presented. As a starting point for investigation or
further research into the problems of these courts, Rough
Justice will more than reward the reader by providing a fleeting
glimpse, a taste, of the diverse aspects of these sometimes forgotten courts of first resort.
It is the extremely broad coverage this book attempts to
provide that is at once both a questionable virtue and its most
objectionable aspect. Rough Justice takes on the herculean
task of commenting on the beginnings, organization and operation of lower courts throughout the nation, without limitation
even as to a particular jurisdiction. For example, the author
included in Part IV, The Performance of Lower Criminal
Courts, an essay by Donald L. Warren entitled "Justice in
Recorder's Courts: An Analysis of Misdemeanor Cases in Detroit."3 The essay is devoted almost exclusively to a statistical
comparison of bail and sentencing orders made by the Recorder's Court of Detroit as between white and black defendants.
While such a survey was undoubtedly useful as an aid to improvement of the operation of Detroit's courts, inclusion of
such material in an anthology that claims to be of nationwide
scope is quite another matter. In his essay, Mr. Warren concluded that, with one or two minor exceptions, blacks generally
fared worse than similarly situated whites, both on bail orders
and on sentencing in Detroit.4 But when Robertson presents a
local survey in a collection of material that purports to be a
general, nationwide, representative survey, the inference is
necessarily that "if blacks are subject to unequal treatment in
Detroit, they must be subject to unequal treatment in lower
courts throughout the nation." 5
This is, of course, merely an example of one point on which
Professor Robertson might well have provided further enlightenment. The Warren essay required an explanation by the author of the reason for its inclusion. Was it intended to suggest
that most lower courts probably practice racial discrimination?
Or was it included as a basis for the much more comfortable
suggestion that racial discrimination has been documented in
Detroit and could exist in numerous other courts? The reader
3. Id. at 326 (previously unpublished report prepared for the Equal Justice Council of Detroit, 1971).
4. Id. at 341-44.
5. Id. at 245-46.
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is left to speculate as to what point Robertson did indeed wish
to make.
Clearly, there is a still broader problem which plagues
Rough Justice and which arose when Robertson first began to
formulate the general approach the book would take. The problem is whether it is feasible even to attempt to assemble a
collection of materials which can shed any real light on, for
example, the performance of lower criminal courts in Los Angeles, California and Denver, Colorado.'
The lower criminal courts are not often the subject of
earth-shattering pronouncements from appellate courts, and as
a consequence their operations do not receive the same scrutiny
that the courts of general criminal jurisdiction do.7 For this
reason, there is found in the lower courts a flexibility and informality which might meet with constitutional objections if duplicated in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. For example, in the recent case of Gerstein v. Pugh,' it was seriously
argued on behalf of the State of Florida that a prosecutor's ex
parte decision that probable cause existed was sufficient basis
to hold a defendant in custody pending formal initiation of
proceedings in a general trial court. The contention, of course,
went too far and the United States Supreme Court rejected it.
However, the case serves to illustrate the differences which
exist, not necessarily in the lower courts themselves but in the
differing state statutory schemes under which they operate. For
example, lower courts in California which hear preliminary felony proceedings are subject to review, if the defendant is held
to answer, by a motion made to the superior court to set aside
the accusatory pleading.' If the evidence as to any essential
element of the offense was improperly admitted by the lower
court over objection, the accusatory pleading will be set aside.,"
Thus, in California, generally the same rules apply at a preliminary proceeding in a lower court as apply at trial. This is an
6. Los Angeles and Denver were arbitrarily selected by the reviewer because he
has recently appeared as counsel for a criminal defendant in both cities and thus is
aware of significant differences in those courts on the practical level.
7. Of course, some appeals from lower criminal courts do reach the highest levels.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966). Both cases were appeals from California municipal courts; but such cases
are the exception.
8. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
9. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§.995, 999(a) (West 1970), providing for review of right
by the superior court and further discretionary review by extraordinary appellate writ.
10. Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 7, 291 P.2d 929, 939 (1955).
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effective method of enforcing compliance by the lower court.
When California's system is contrasted with Florida's approach, which permitted as a valid alternative a prosecutor's
ex parte conclusion that probable cause existed, it is clear that
statutory provisions relating to procedures in lowercourts cover
an immense and varied spectrum.
In light of the differing functions assigned lower criminal
courts by the various state legislatures, it seems a fruitless task
to attempt to suggest generalized conclusions on the basis of a
number of essays, each of which, with an occasional exception,
deals with a particular jurisdiction. In a word, Rough Justice
suffers from overbreadth. An author would be hard-put to deal
adequately in a single volume with the problems in any single
jurisdiction's lower courts, much less to suggest realistic solutions. Yet Professor Robertson has attempted both tasks, and
not for just one jurisdiction but-with grand indifference to
reality-for any and all.
The fifth part of Rough Justice is perhaps the least useful
to anyone but the classic ivory-tower theorist." Five essays are
presented in Part V; three of the five are concerned with a type
of "family" or "community council" forum for resolving minor
criminal violations. An essay by Professor Griffiths is presented
that apparently proposes some sort of "family" forum in which
the "transgressor" would first be reassured of the love of society
and would then be spanked.'" This description, of course, takes
some advantage of the reviewer's literary license, but Griffiths'
essay is of little practical worth, particularly since it purports
to reveal deficiencies in Packer's classic The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction.1
Packer described two models of the criminal process, intended to exemplify the polar ends of the two general competing schools of criminal procedure philosophy. Each model was
used by Packer simply to represent a school of current thought
in the criminal law and to provide a communications referent.
These two paradigms, the Crime Control Model and the Due
Process Model (the "law and order" model and "defendants'
rights" model, in the reviewer's terms), are attacked by Griffiths, who apparently did not read enough of The Limits of the
11.

ROBERTSON,

at 345-431.

12. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure,or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process in ROBERTSON, at 347, reprinted from 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1971).
13. H. PACKER, Two Models of the Criminal Process in THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 (1968), reprinted in ROBERTSON, at 136.
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Criminal Sanction to understand Professor Packer's clear explanation of the models' use.' 4
One quotation from Griffiths seems uniquely apropos:
"Basic faith in public officials would revolutionize American
criminal procedure."' 5 In fairness to Griffiths, his essay was
written in 1971. We have learned much in the last four years
about "basic faith in public officials." But this reviewer shares
the skepticism of the framers of the Bill of Rights: don't trouble
me with "faith healers"; give me instead a competent lawyer
acting on my behalf and my behalf alone in an adversary system. Spare me also a community council or a "family model."
As an accused misdemeanant, I would feel much more secure
with 1) a municipal court staffed by a competent, highly-paid
judge who is not asked to do the work of five judges; and 2) a
court which does not have to waste expensive talent on traffic
offenses, on drunks, on minor narcotics offenders, on nonsupporting husbands. In other words, give me a court run by
an expert who is paid like an expert, treated like an expert, and
expected to produce a result consonant with that expertise. For
assistance in achieving that goal, give me a book which suggests realistic proposals for improvement of the system we
have. If the lower courts are overworked, underpaid and provided with inadequate facilities, why not propose solutions to
those obvious problems?
One essay in Part IV of Rough Justice does just that.
"Traffic Court Reform"'" advances a worthwhile proposal for
removal of minor traffic offenses from the criminal courts and
transfer to an administrative agency. Such a proposal is well
worth considering. Unfortunately, too many of the essays selected by Robertson are so theoretical that they offer little more
than exercise for the mental gymnast.
Lest this review has seemed unduly critical of Professor
Robertson, his work is marred perhaps more than anything by
the dearth of useful materials from which he could have made
his selection. However, this does not explain the simplistic
Reader's Digest format of Rough Justice. Much, much more of
the author's own views would have been welcome.
However, to Professor Robertson's credit is the fact that a
careful reading of Rough Justice necessarily leads one to serious
14.
15.
16.

at 137-38.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 435, reprinted from 4 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PRoB. 255 (1966).
ROBERTSON,

704
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and recurring questions about the problems of the lower courts,
the role they play in the criminal justice system, and what can
be done to improve them. The book should be read, if for no
reason other than to provide some background for a serious
exploration of these questions.

AGGRESSION AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE.

By Jeffrey H. Goldstein.

New York: Oxford University Press. 1975. Pp. xiv + 192. Cloth.

$8.95.
Reviewed by JAMES HIGH, M.D.*
"While it is tempting to want to fix blame for,an aggressive
episode on either the offender or the victim, it is likely in many
cases to be due largely to fortuitous and impersonal characteristics of the environment."' This statement embodies both the
primary thesis of this book, and the crux of the many controversies surrounding violence and society's response to it.
Violence is to the behavioral sciences what cancer is to
medical sciences: a multifaceted, multidetermined "disease,"
the roots of which seem to lie in subtle alterations in the normal
functioning of the organism. The implication of such complexity and close proximity to normal life processes is that violence,
like cancer, simply will not yield to heavy-handed solutions.
We must first gain a full understanding of normal developmental processes and the many environmental factors which subvert them, as well as the immediate factors which precipitate
violent acts. Unsophisticated assaults on the problem of violence and aggression promise to be useless quackery at best, or
at worst to threaten the life of the "patient"-and we are all
"patients" where aggression and violence are concerned, by
virtue of being humans in a human society. Consequently, proposed changes and prohibitions meant for us and our society
must be examined with a most critical eye, no matter how
desirable the goals may seem.
In light of this, I must applaud Professor Goldstein's effort
to give sound, factual, scientific backing for his proposals,
many of which seem sensible and long overdue. Unfortunately,
however, I think his work meets with only partial success. To
some degree this is due to an unevenness in the scientific validity of quoted studies, and to the rather dubious pertinence of
*

A.B., 1965, M.D., 1968, Indiana University; intern and resident in psychiatry

at Los Angeles County, University of Southern California Medical Center, 1968-72;
former staff psychiatrist, California Adult Authority, Parole Outpatient Clinic, Los
Angeles; Instructor in Psychiatry, University of Southern California; private practice,
Long Beach and Beverly Hills.
1. J. GOLDSTEIN, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 84 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as GOLDSTEINI.
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the studies he cites to the proposals he is attempting to support.
There is a still more serious problem with this book. To
date, virtually all attempts to implement societal reforms designed to reduce violence, or even to study it systematically,
have been thwarted by partisan squabbles.' This has happened
despite the fact that "law and order," presumably including
the reduction of violence, has been identified as a major concern of the American public at least since the 1968 presidential
election. We are divided on the issue of fault, or as a psychologist might put it, the "locus of control." The question that
triggers partisanship is, does the cause of violence reside within
the individual, or is it external to the individual, in his society?
Witness the rhetoric over the issue of gun control: "Control
Criminals not Guns," 3 or "The difference Between An Assault
and a Homicide is a Gun."' The arguments, of course, branch
out into other questions such as individual versus societal
rights; but I believe my basic diagnosis of the conflict is accurate. Professor Goldstein seems to agree when he acknowledges
that "the formal and informal policies and controls which are
used to reduce aggression are influenced by whether aggression
5
is conceived of as innate or learned."
Goldstein reveals his own partisanship as early as the introduction, where he states that he has "stressed social and
environmental determinants of aggression" in order to "counterbalance" what he sees as a "recent overemphasis . . . . on
biological determinants of aggression." ' Compare this attitude
with that of Konrad Lorenz, a Nobel prize winner whose orientation is toward the innate, instinctual, internal factors of
human behavior, when he says, "The equipment of man...
is just as dependent on cultural tradition and rational responsibility as, conversely, the function of both the latter is dependent on instinctual motivation."7 Lorenz, unlike Goldstein,
apparently sees the problem of human behavior as an interplay
of forces, the internal influencing the external and vice versa.
2. The premature demise of the projected UCLA Center for the Study and Control of Violence is a prime example. Plans were shelved after it was attacked from both
right and left.
3. Bumper sticker seen on San Diego freeway.
4. GOLDSTEIN, at 119.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at xii.

7.

K.

LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION

256 (1966).
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In the opening chapter Professor Goldstein systematically
rejects the contributions of such respected scientists and thinkers as ethologist Lorenz, neurophysiologist Jose Delgado, and
of course Sigmund Freud8 (but ritualistic disparagement of
Freud appears in the first chapter of virtually every book by a
psychologist with anything to say). In so doing, he is discarding
all fields of study and all evidence which might place the locus
of control within the individual. His desire to provide a "counterbalance" is acknowledged, and is understandable given his
orientation as a social psychologist.
Unfortunately such "cognitive devaluation," to quote the
author out of context, detracts from the scientific value of his
own work and reduces it to something approaching a propaganda pamphlet. Scientific method demands the expansion of
theory to include all data, not the exclusion of data to make a
point. The latter is the technique of a politician, not a scientist.
I suppose I had hoped this book would contribute to a long
overdue comprehensive theory of aggression and perhaps offer
a plan to tackle the problem. I was disappointed. The book is
the first in a series called the "Reconstruction of Society Series." I am afraid the reconstruction will have to await better
and more convincing theories and plans than those presented
by Professor Goldstein.
8.

GOLDSTEIN,

at 4-11.

THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES.

By Martin J. Norris.

Rochester: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 3d ed.
Pp. xvi + Vol. I 561, Vol. II 673. $70.00.
Reviewed by Myron H. Nordquist*
The first edition of The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries
was published in 1958. Since the release of the second edition
in 1966, a number of developments have occurred in this field.
Several of the more important events are the advent of the
unified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of legislation
amending the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Both subjects are treated in this third, two-volume
edition, which also contains a new chapter on negligence and
up-dated chapters on products liability and on practice and
procedure.
Three-fourths of Volume 2 consists of appendices, tables and
an index. The four appendices are the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (as amended in 1972), the
Safety and Health Standards for Maritime Employments (revised in October, 1972), the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms. There are
179 pages devoted to a table of personal injury cases concerning
harbor workers, passengers, visitors and others. The author
then provides an alphabetical listing of cases cited in the various sections of the book. Tables are also provided on the references he makes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
sections of the United States Code. The last 50 pages of Volume
2 are a comprehensive index of some 2000 entries.
The 13 substantive chapters in the third edition are patterned on Norris' prior editions, with 334 sections arranged
topically. For the non-specialist, the main appeal of the volumes is as a digest of the principal issues one is likely to encounter in a maritime personal injury suit. Moreover, the text
is written in an easily understood style with short, direct sentences.
For the specialist, the brevity of the narrative text probably
makes it less useful than the appendices and case listings.
* Office Director, Office of Law of the Sea Negotiations, U.S. Department of
State; B.S., Oregon State University; J.D., California Western University.
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Overall, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries is a handy,
quick reference to introduce principal issues and to guide its
user to primary sources. The volumes are superbly organized
and can be of practical value to both attorneys and nonattorneys concerned with this subject.

